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SPECIAL POSITION OF SRIJEM IN 
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT ON THE EVE OF 
AND DURING WORLD WAR ONE
Ivan BULIĆ*
It is affirmed in historiography that Srijem area had special military-
strategic and social significance. Precisely in this part of Triune Kingdom, 
more intensive disputes between Austria-Hungary and Kingdom of Serbia 
had become evident. Serbian Government succeeded in multiple manners, 
in this period, in influencing on political, social and security conditions of 
Srijem. Regarding their objectives, between Monarchy and Croatia, there 
is an equivalent sign, therefore Serbs and Serbians regarded the war as a 
beginning of final battle with both subjects. The objective was destruction 
of Monarchy and expansion to Croatia. Exposed to such aggressive acts, 
Austria-Hungary started to analyze the mode of protecting itself. In this, 
having in mind complexity of relations within the Monarchy, defectiveness 
was evident. Francis Ferdinand, an heir to the throne and main headquarters 
of the army, in difference to other relevant persons and institutions in 
Monarchy, considered it as a serious problem and contemplated possible 
answer to face Serbian activities. They started planning offensive actions 
from Croatian territory, within which Srijem held special significance 
for the reason that only offensive actions should be conducted in border 
area. Differences in interests were unique, henceforth events during 
first months of war were intensive. About these events, works of present 
historiography and publicists are incomplete and even when being written 
about the subject, political, military, demographic and geographic context 
had been ignored. Evaluations were one-sided, usual for stance of Yugoslav 
historiography toward topics regarding Croatia at the beginning of World 
War One. As every war in history by itself is mutual, historian in evaluation 
of the same is supposed to take all relevant factors in consideration, which 
is fundamental purpose of this work. 
Key words: Srijem, World War One, Austria-Hungary, Triune Kingdom of 
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, Kingdom of Serbia.
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Introduction
This article presents good opportunity for paying attention to the fact that 
in 2014, commemorating 100-year anniversary of outbreak of the Great War, 
many national historiographies intensified their approach to analyze World 
War One. They have tried to explain how events of the war influenced their 
ethnic and national territory, as well as it’s aftermath (multiple context: po-
litical, social and demographic). Considerably, one part of Croatian historians 
decided to explore World War One.
Scientific interest abovementioned is immanent to the fact of general 
and local knowledge of the area, significant for it’s military-strategic 
importance during World War One. This evaluations refer to Srijem in 
particular. Regarding military-strategic significance, complexity of events and 
nationalities of population exposed to propaganda, armed conflict actions 
and their consequences, topic attracted interest of both Croatian and Serbian 
historiography. This fact is also clear recently. A year ago, we were able to listen 
to exposition of Aleksandar Ljutić from Institute of newer history of Serbia at 
scientific assembly “River Sava in Croatian History” and read the article titled 
“Serbian-Austro-Hungarian fighting on lower Sava in 1914” respectively.1 
Although intention is not writing a review of dr. Lukić’s article, it would be 
preferable to take the fact in consideration that the word is about the author 
who wrote the text on military activities in Srijem, therefore it is the topic of 
this article too. In difference to dr. Lukić, I intended to offer integral view of 
events in Srijem during World War One, not disregarding causes and effects, 
specially from the beginning of war.  In difference to dr. Lukić, I made effort 
to consult archive material of Croatian, Austro-Hungarian and Serbian origin 
and apply comparative historiographic method. Analysis of dr. Lukić article 
motivated me exactly in applying methodic approach beforementioned, due to 
the fact it is written on Serbian archive material exclusively, thus representing 
modern interpretation immanent to scientific and publicist works from 1918 
until 1990. In that context, I would like to emphasize even tendentious claims 
such as “Austria-Hungary used Sarajevo Assassination to attack Serbia.”2 from 
which is clear that, even significant time distance from events herein mentioned 
had lapsed, ideologic and political burden remains. Since it is already like that, 
it is essential to answer and remind the author with counter question suggesting 
foresight regarding notorious fact that Sarajevo Assassination was executed by 
the hands of Serbs along with the support of High Command of Serbian Army. 
Accordingly, reflecting the causes and effects context, I fail to comprehend 
1 Aleksandar Lukić, “Srpsko-austrougarske borbe na donjoj Savi 1914. godine” [“Serbian-Aus-
tro-Hungarian fightings on Lower Sava 1914”], Rijeka Sava u povijesti. Zbornik radova znanst-
venog skupa [River Sava in History Collection of papers from scientific assembly], (Slavonski Brod, 
2015), pp. 451- 478.
2 Ibid., 451.
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the manner in which Austria-Hungary took advantage of attack on Serbia? 
In general, Lukić interpretation missed the historic method. The armed 
combats in Srijem were not analized within geopolitical, social, religious and 
demographic factors accordingly. Nevertheless, armed combats in Srijem are 
of priority interest, yet too, represented one-sidedly, again on the ground of 
serbian archive material or literature. Methodological comparative approach 
had been left out completelly. Therefore, in my opinion this work represents 
just collection of information from various authors, published in one place. 
“Nothing new” so to speak. Just another repetition of known interpretations 
about events in Srijem in World War One, identical to many texts from inter-
war period written on account of actual historigraphic interest for World War 
One events. 
Analysis of Srijem events indicate to more complex relations as every war 
has causes and effects which are visible in smaller teritorial units.  These events 
justify this claim.
Because of evaluation of aforementioned events, I am in a position to come 
to the conclusion that significant time difference and accessibility of archive 
material offers contemporary, modern and un-bias approach. Furthermore, 
the starting point is the fact that historiography did not explore it or explored 
it just in context of political and ideologic expectation of time. Efforts to cor-
rect unilateral argumentation had been left out, so my task is to point out the 
pointlessness of continuing by the same pattern. 
Croatian and Yugoslav historiography did not deal with World War One in 
general. More attention was paid to last year of war, for the reason of Croatia 
adjoining the state community with Serbia. Meanwhile, the historic research of 
pre-war years and first year of war were left out. Why? Answerig this question 
is logical: this is a starting-point period. Contacts had been established with of-
ficial Serbia, multiple aid received from the same state while political programs 
were formed finally. Influence of these factors is visible right away after the 
Sarajevo Assasination, especially in first months of war, altogether resulting in 
events from the end of the year 1918. At that moment, union with Kingdom of 
Serbia was proclaimed, in which Croatia never shared state community with 
Serbia before. That way, Croatia left the Central-European political circle and 
became part of Balkan geopolitical context for the first time in history.
During this period many events took place in Srijem, many persons and 
institutions participated and notable Srijemese gave their accounts. Having 
in mind chronological flow and caracter, I shall structure my analysis as fol-
lows. Considering pre-war period I shall endeavour to point out geopolitical 
position of Srijem reflecting on premanent intelligence control from Serbian 
Government of the area and reaction to it from Vienna military and political 
decision-makers respectively. Attention shall be focused on pre-war activities 
of political bodies who minorized the possible danger on Eastern borders of 
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Monarchy contrary to military headquarters paying more attention to tactical 
and startegical aspects of Srijem area. Since the outbreak of war had deter-
mined military-strategic context of Srijem furthermore, my intention is to em-
phasize the most important events such as: military combats, population’s view 
on war, Austro-Hungarian measures, Serbian Army breakthrough in Srijem, 
evacuation of population and their return.
Pre-war period
In the beginning, it is essential to define foreign and domestic policy 
frame. Multiple events in Croatia and neighbouring countries, specially King-
dom of Serbia, put year 1903 as a staging-point in particular. Popular people’s 
movement occured in Croatia, Khuen Hedervary left the office, while in Serbia 
Obrenić Dinasty was dethroned. Succeding Dinasty Karađorđević, altered for-
eign policy objectives fundamentally, especially regarding Austria-Hungary. 
Monarchy became an obstacle to their first foreign policy objective: expansion 
to the West, to southern slavs lands of Habsburg Monarchy. From that mo-
ment onwards, Main headquarters of Astria-Hungarian Army, familiar with 
numerous propaganda and intelligence activities initiated from Serbian po-
litical leadership, started detailed planning and articulating possible attack on 
Serbia from Srijem area. 
Essentially, by the outbreak of Balkan wars grand-serbian propaganda 
spred throughout southern-slavs lands of Monarchy. Afterwards, it was unnec-
essary to chanellize it due to the fact that course and aftermath of the Blakan 
wars intensfied the impression in Serbia’s favour. Propaganda activities spread 
to many levels of social life. Many writers and artists supported the idea of 
Yugoslav union and therefore propaganda influence in culture and literature 
had been made possible. For that reason, Antun Gustav Matoš minuted that 
for Serbs, even literature is used as a powerful tool of propaganda.3
Altough the period from annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina is considered 
as the beginning of more agressive Serbian stance to Austria-Hungary, one 
can find archive material of intelligence caracter which states clearly Operative 
Department of Serbian High Command of the Army organized gathering of 
information in the year of 1906 already. In one of the reports, captain Emilo 
Belić desrcibes peformed activities in details.4
Furthemore, during annexation crisis, in March 1909 precisely, Serbian 
Ministry of War had informed foreign minister Milovan Milovanić of intelligence 
3 Antun Gustav Matoš, Bilježnice [Collected works], Vol.2, (Zagreb, 1973), pp. 118-119. 
4 Hrvatski državni arhiv [Croatian State Archive, Zagreb] (furhter: HR-HDA) - 79, Osobni 
odjel Zemaljske vlade – Središnja izvještajna služba [Internal department of Land Government–
Central defensive intelligence Service] (further: IDLG-CDIS), Box 28, Nr. 4097/403, 3655-1915.
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information at their disposal, considering mobilisation of 13th military district 
and cannon placement in Nova Pazova, 24 km from Belgrade.5 
Even after the annexation crisis had ended, Serbian Headquarters has been 
organizing network of associates who delt with secret investigation of Srijem 
area. They have intensified their activities during Balkan wars, when Austria-
Hungarian intervention was expected to take place. Major Dimitrije Pavlović 
had informed Headquarters about Austro-Hungarian counter messures for 
preventing transport of Komites and weapons. It is written in the report: “to 
keep the Serbian border element in fear because relevant circles of neighbouring 
Monarchy created belief we are preparing a revolution in Serbian territories”.6 
It is clear Serbian army after annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina had orga-
nized collecting of intelligence information on Austro-Hungarian Army and 
information on public opinion of population and their readiness for war in 
favour of Serbia respectively. Serbian intelligence activities were performed 
until the outbreak of war. Few months before the war, Croatian Goverment 
had received the report on situation in Srijem describing how “entire Srijem is 
overfilled with various pictures and calenders (...) pictures of King Peter and 
several Serbian Generals (...) leading to preparation of people in Srijem and 
Southern Hungary to strive for Serbia.”7 
Therefore, their activities are permanent. In archive material it is traceable 
to the beginning of war. Only on the eve of war, minister for war Alexander 
von Krobatin had warned Croatian ban Ivan Skerlecz that Serbian society “Na-
tional defense” had conducted preparations in case of war. They have secured 
100.000 pieces of light weapons and large quantity of ammunition for Serbian 
population and intended to transport it illegally to territories designated for 
rebellion. They intended to transport weapons from Požarevac warehouse to 
Bačka and Banat and from Belgrade warehouse through Mitrovica to Srijem. 
The report warned that “National defense” prepared 1.700 komites for fighting 
in Bosnia and Slavonia.8 Credibility of Austro-Hungarian intelligence sourc-
es was confirmed after the capture of Belgrade. Documents had been found 
prooving recorded payments to numerous Serbian agents for collecting infor-
mation about Austro-Hungarian Army.9 “National defense” reports to Serbian 
minister of war relating estimate of strenght for XV military district, reports 
on gunnery in Bosnia-Hercegovina and preparations of Austro-Hungarian 
Army in Croatia, Slavonia and Srijem had been found also.10 
5 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 28, Nr. 560/244.
6 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 28, Nr. 412/4097-1916.
7 HR-HDA-78, Predsjedništvo Zemaljske vlade [Presidency of Land Government] (further: 
PLG), Box 829, File Nr. 471/1914, Mitrovica, 1/24/1914.
8 HR-HDA-833, Osobni fond [Personal Fund] (further: PF) Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 
12.662, Budapest, 7/29/1914; Graf Stefan Tisza, Briefe (1914-1918.), “FZM. Alexander von Kro-
batin, öst.-ung. Kriegsminister an Graf Stefan Tisza”, Vienna, 7/14/1914, (Berlin, 1928), p. 41.
9 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 27, Nr. 3805-1916/626-64, Užice, 3/31/1913.
10 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 27, Nr. 3805-1916/206-47, Belgrade, 3/1/1913.
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For that reason, Commander in Ruma, general Schön made county official 
aware of the condition estimate among local population and their possible at-
tack from the rear during Sava crossing. He suggested punishment for every 
single person in possesion of weapons.11 
Events followed indicate to what extent army authorities estimated the 
situation correctly and within cause-effect context warned how political mood 
of Srijem inhabitants might have had significant consequences regarding ex-
pected hostilities. 
However, Austro-Hungarian dualities between Austria and Hungary until 
the Settlement of 1867 and dualities from Settlement until the outbreak of war 
respectively, continued after Sarajevo assasination. During war period, Hun-
garian insistment on high level of authonomy for Hungary, have been opposed 
by Headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian Army. This body represented con-
tuniuty of politics of murdered heir Francis Ferdinand. Situation further com-
plicated Emperors’ insistment on literal implementation of dualistic principles. 
These principles had not been abandoned during war, even tough indangering 
the fighting ability of the army on battlefield on many occasions. It happened 
that exactly the high level of political unity had been left out due to inherited 
political differences. Numerous examples proove the statement. One of them 
is Srijem situation. Eminent officers of the army pointed these problems out 
after the war. General Alferd Kraus in his book The Causes of our defeat  amid 
other insufficinecies pointed out problems deriving from Austro-Hungarian 
Settlement. From certain time distance he noticed how unresolved political 
relations damaged fighting ability of the army. Regarding the fact he was an ex-
traordinary militrary strategist, Austro-Hungarian Army managed to control 
Srijem and Banat only after his takeover of command, I believe it is necessary 
to point out Hungarian favourite blackmail: disapproval for army’s require-
ments. The fact that Hungary refused the request to increase the number of 
newly mobilised soldiers, necessary for formation of new artilery regiments, is 
in direct link to diminuation of combat readiness, which eventullay put Hun-
garian troops in difficult position during first fightings on Isonzo river.12
Disunion in application of war laws 
Istvan Tisza, Hungarian Minister-President, initiated by Sarajevo assa-
sination, in his parliamentary speech on July 18, 1914, was the first politician 
11 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 815, Nr. 257-7223.
12 Alfred Kraus, Uzroci našeg poraza [The Causes of Our Defeat], (Belgrade, 1938), p. 79; Author 
is general of Austro-Hungarian army. Took part in all important battles against Serbia in the 
year of 1914 and commanded Austro-Hungarian troops on Russian and Italian battlefronts later 
in the war. After ascending the throne, Emperor Charles had offered him the post of Chief of 
General staff in headquarters of the army, which Kraus had refused. 
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in Monarchy who had offered clarification of military-security situation in 
Croatia and Slavonia. In his repsonse to parliamentary interepelation in joint 
Parliament in Budapest, he stressed that toward great-serbian propaganda in 
Croatia, not enough energetic measures were being taken. Considering the 
importance of the subject, press conference was summoned and Croatian ban 
Ivan Skerlecz attended together with Minister-President Tisza. Tisza’s instruc-
tions and observations had started implementing immediately.13  
More intensive acts of governing bodies of the Monarchy where visible 
in the moment Monarchy decided to go to war. Preparations were made for 
proclamation and application of priory composed legal articles adjusted to war 
situation. According to this development of events, it was necessary to finish 
all mobilization affairs in short notice: from drafting to implementing legal 
articles.     
Bearing in mind that mobilization represents new orientation in internal 
relations of all social groups completely, making effort to minimize estimates 
of public opinion on the size of conflict in the same time, Ministry of War sent 
circular letter on July 20, 1914 to all relevant political bodies, presidents of 
governments in both parts of Monarchy, all important ministries and Croatian 
ban Skerlecz.
Content of this letter emphasized that extraordinary political situation re-
quired haste reaction: it was demanded from Croatian ban Skerlecz and other 
representatives to, within the scope of their authorities, prevent publishing in-
formation about military preparations in daily press. That way it was intended 
to remove every possible panic reaction of population and guide public opin-
ion to positions suitable for authorities. The urgency required suggestion to 
perform the procedure by telegram.14 It was about the command designed to 
secure formation and execution of priory prepared measures as effective as 
possible during war relating to: emergency measures for the state of war, mar-
tial law and military tribunal with civil and military censorship. Legal frame 
for introduction of exceptional measures represented Law Article LVIII for ex-
ceptional measures in case of war, proclaimed by joint Hungarian-Croatian Par-
limanet on Decmber 21, 1912. However, entire elements of this law, specially 
orders about affairs of the press, were not valid for Croatia and Slavonia for the 
reason that certain sections of these orders applied to affairs within the scope 
of autonomous affairs, not applicable in Triune Kingdom, unless being ratified 
by Croatian Parliament. Therefore, Emperor Francis Joseph, within his consti-
tutional authorities, had delegated the power for Law Article LVIII to Croatian 
ban Skerlecz on July 22, 1914.15  That way on July 27, Croatian ban Skerlecz 
13 Narodno jedinstvo [National Unitiy], Nr. 29, July 18, 1914, 1-3.
14 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 72, Nr. 9650, July 20, 1914, 1.
15 “Izvanredne mjere u slučaju rata” [“Exceptional measures in case of war”], Narodne novine 
[National Gazette], Nr. 170,  July 27, 1914, 1-7.
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had been granted full power to trigger  Exceptional measures in case of war as 
a legal basis for 18 Ban’s executive orders.16 Observing all announcements and 
proclamations in total, it is clear that on territory of Triune Kingdom entire 
system of laws had been established, commonly defined as “war laws”.
Dealing with numerous problems across Croatia required adequate num-
ber of people with special powers. For that matter, Skerlecz had used one more 
possibility on the gorund of application of special measures: appointing gov-
ernment commissioners. These measures were executed in consensus with 
Hungarian government and proclaimed the same day as Exceptional mea-
sures. Change revealed itself within authorities coordinated with war situation. 
Tisza had made Croatian Government familiar with it in his memorandum 
stating: “... in case of military prearation for certain headquarters, civil comis-
sioners are appointed. Their task is (...) to support military bodies with ad-
vice in knowning circumstances and local affairs, mediation between military 
headquarters and administrative authorities (...) and eventually to take part in 
governing occupied territory of the enemy”.17 
Government commissioners had duties to act accordingly to military com-
mand plans. Area of activity of appointed commissioner could have been more 
counties or cities, depending on military formation deployment.18
Adjusting the territory of Triune Kingdom to war situation, official Buda-
pest had influenced the process through “War surveillance commission in Bu-
dapest”. It was the same institution established just before the war in Wienna 
under the name of “Office for war surveillance” (Kriegs-überwachungsamt-
KÜA).19 By rejecting comptence of this office, Tisza had emphasized Hungar-
ian authonomy within the Monarchy frame. Commission for war surveillance 
in Budapest, in consent with Hungarian Government, but not Office for war 
surveillance in Wienna, had appointed the special government commissioner 
for command area of Southern army, therefore for those troops designated for 
offensive action against Serbia.20
16 Ibid.
17 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 865, Nr. 79-4096, File Nr. 520, Pr – 1914.
18 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 872, Nr. 4333. Pr. – 1914, Zagreb, July 22, 1914.
19 27th of July 1914, deputies of most important ministeries in Vienna had declared com-
mencement of official operations of “Office for war surveillance” (Kriegs-überwachungsamt-
KÜA). Created upon Agreement between Ministry of War, Main Headquarters and Ministry 
Council. Represented central state body for exceptional measures coordination. Legally under 
command of Ministry of War. Organitionally consisted of: political group, censorship group, 
export-import group, machine evidence group and special activities. Most important represen-
tatives of state ministeries were represented in it. They had duties, depending on extent of works, 
to delegate part of state activities from basic ministeries into Office. By determined procedure, 
Office had been charged with implementation of all criminal measures commited against state 
legal order during the war. See: Gustav Spann, Zensur in Österreich während des I. Weltkriegs 
1914-1918, (Vienna, 1972), pp. 57-59.
20 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 871, Nr. 4233-4283 File Nr. 4278, July 25, 1914.
Review of Croatian History 13/2017, no. 1, 119 - 148
127
Institute of government commisssioner amid military consisted of civil 
component too. Former Grand Mayors have been renamed in government 
commissioners, representing, together with Ban, civil component assigned to 
execute exceptional measures and war laws among population not involved 
in combat fightings activelly. That way, they represented the link between city 
council and Government as quarantees for execution of all measures Govern-
ment had put before them. For Srijem County and city of Zemun with seat in 
Vukovar, noble Imbro Hideghwety had been appointed.21
The extent to which Srijem territory had important geopolitical position 
witness the fact related to dual appointment of government commissioners. 
Among Imbro Hideghwety, government commisssioner responsible to Croa-
tian Ban, Hungarian Government had interveened and appointed Bela Tal-
lian, former Grand Mayor of Novi Sad and a member of Hungarian House of 
Magnates. He was appointed as commissioner of Hungarian Government at 
Southern Military Command.22 
From aforementioned, a few facts are evident. First of all, it is clear military 
and political headquarters had estimated Srijem, Bačka and Banat being of 
extreme geostrategic importance. On the other hand, as example beforemen-
tioned showed points to certain level of  mistrust between political and mili-
tary headquarters. Relations which followed soonafter ie. different perception 
of events, foreshadows to the fact that military and civil representatives had 
acted regarded these authorities and events differently. 
Abovementioned fact is clear in analysis of the relationship between Hun-
garian Government and Main Headqaurters of the Army, as well as between 
Hungarian military commisssioner and Croatian Government commissioner. 
Period from Sarajevo assasination until proclamation of state of war
In numerous accounts from great-Serbian propaganda court cases it is no-
table that Sarajevo assasination gave incentive to Serbian population. Confi-
dence of Serbian population augmented in Triune Kingdom and it had openly 
stressed their political opinions without doubting the outcome of war with-
out restraints. Remarkably, their reflections are not directed to one objective: 
bringing down the Monarchy. By analyzing numerous court cases nationwide 
Croatia, a certain constant is notable ie. statements of identical political char-
acter, expressed regardless of place or part of Croatia.
Many conclusions are evident in analyzing these scriptures, all sum-
marized in fundamental conclusion that Serbian population in Croatia had 
considered Monarchy and Croatia as the same nuisance. In relation to their 
21 “The Order”, Narodne novine [National Gazette], Nr. 170, July 27, 1914, 6.
22 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 871, Nr. 4233-4283, File Nr. 4278, July 25, 1914.
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objectives, between Monarchy and Croatia there is an equivalent sign and they 
regarded assassination and war as a beginning of final fight with both of them. 
Objective was to topple the Monarchy and expand to Croatia. For example, 
from the report of County district Đakovo, threats were not only verbal. It is 
written that on July 27, 1914 a group of 100 people of Serbian nationality had 
attacked inhabitants of Croatian nationality in neighboring town while they 
were heading to sign up for the army.23
Ivan Peršić, member of Croatian Parliament and representative of Starčević 
Party of Right had testified about events preceding immediate outbreak of war. 
He wrote that in Croatia only few days after the assasination: “...only Ban Škrlec, 
military commander Rhemen, dr. Aleksandar Horvat and dr. Ivica Frank knew 
war with Serbia is entirelly certain, no matter she responds to even the most 
humiliating demands of Austria-Hungary”24 
In analyzing the events of first two weeks of war, we are able to complete 
Peršić’s testimony. By Skerelcz’s stance in Parliament, especially his small par-
ticipation in arguments, it can be concluded that in first two weeks after the 
assasination he wasn’t informed regulary about actual decisions being made. 
Archive material and daily press do not show information that Skerlecz, apart 
from calming down protests and demonstrations, had more active role in daily 
events. First two weeks he did not communicate with Vienna and Budapest. 
However, as decision for entering the war became more apparent, Skerlecz 
took over more obligations.  Council of Ministers met more often and made 
decisions for which execution they included Croatian Ban. From Zagreb Gov-
ernment they demanded additional information on anti-monarchy activity. 
Minister-President Tisza and minister of foreign afairs Leopold von Berhtold 
insisted on these reports, and they were among Francis Joseph, most impor-
tant statesmen in Monarchy. Besides that, Tisza took advantage of his formally 
superior position over Croatian Ban, thus formulating request in a different 
content. He addressed Skerlecz: “Dear friend! I inform you completelly con-
fidentially that we collect that concrete information that shed light on those 
machinations directed from Serbia against us and which confirm acts or omis-
sions of Serbian official circles against us. I beg You most dearly, please be kind 
and compose material at Your disposal, discreetly and possibly as fast as You 
can, and send it to me in short manner. The issue is very urgent and it is uncon-
ditionally wishful nothing come to public. You would obligate me much, if You 
inform me right upon reception of my letter, whether You will be able to send 
me information consisting facts of heavy nature. From the heart I am sending 
you my greetings, Your’s trully loyal Tisza”.25 
23 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 871, Nr. 4233-4283, File Nr. 4605, Đakovo, July 28, 1914.
24 HR-HDA-849, Personal fund Ivan Peršić, Annex to part two of file “From Croatian politics 
half a century ago”, 1914-1939, 1.
25 Dr. Đuro Šurmin had discovered hereinmentioned Tisza’s letter to Croatian Ban Skerlecz. 
He interpreted it in newpapers article “Responsibility for World War-Graf Tisza and Graf 
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Remarkably, Tisza did not send abovementioned letter in official way but 
as a private shipment, therefore he had been expecting the answer in the same 
way. Therefore, the fact: “I beg You most dearly, please be kind and compose 
material at Your disposal, discretly and if possible, as fast as You can send it 
to me in short notice.” From the stated suggestion it is clear Tisza intended to 
surpass the influence of Main Headquarters of the Army and other statesmen. 
Unusal for pre-war situation. Unusual for the fact he is addressing to the head 
of Croatian Government assigned to the area designated for offensive actions 
on Serbia. 
Already on July 12, 1914 Skerlecz had informed Tisza and Berchtold of 
sending them collected material. Skerlecz received these materials from three 
different sources collected in three different locations in Croatia: reports from 
Zemun constabulary, reports of Zagreb constabulary and report from the di-
rector of Central Defensive Intelligence Service, Žiga Maravić. All described 
beginning and development of great-Serbian propaganda on Croatian terri-
tory from annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina until Sarajevo assassination.
Commander of Zemun constabulary ahd divided the development of 
great-Serbian propaganda into two periods: from Annexion in the year of 1908 
until 1911, and from the year of 1911 until 1914 ie. beginning of war. From 
voluminous report, I extract the part regarding border area. During 1914, bor-
der constabulary had recorded more frequent crossings of Croatian students 
to Serbia. It wasn’t unknow to them that Živko Bertić26, member of Croatian 
Parliament and representative of Croatian-Serbian coalition, aided Luka Jukić 
and Rudolf Hercigonja financially to cross over to Serbia and further to Bel-
grade from Srijem area.27
Helping these young men would not represent anti-state activity unless 
they haven’t gone to Belgrade in order to conduct an assassination on terri-
tory of the Monarchy, which Jukić had done eventually by attempting the life 
of Slavko Cuvaj with fatal consequences for two mortally wounded persons 
in the centre of Zagreb. Hercigonja’s case is not negligible either. With Bertić’s 
support, he had travelled to Serbia to demand aid for release of the attacker 
Berchtold ask Ban Skerlecz for documents”. Šurmin’s conclusions can be accepted according to 
circumstances Hungarian Minister-President had found himself in these days.  
26 Živko Bertić (Kukujevci, Srijem, 1875 - Zemun 1938) was a Croatian writer, essayist, satirist, 
comedian, writer of short stories, lawyer and a politician. As a University student, he partici-
pated in burning of the Hungarian flag in 1895, and after serving his prison sentence, he had 
continued his studies in Prague. Doctorate in Law he achieved in Zagreb and continued his 
apprenticeship in Zemun in 1906. He was a Member of Parliament and member of Croatian-
Serbian coalition. During World War One he was imprisoned, interned and as a degraded officer 
of the army sent to Italian battlefront afterwards. After the war he was member of Temporary 
National Representation. He joined Croatian community later. Last years of his life he did not 
participate in political life. In political texts, social satires and short stories he worked for many 
journals: Prosvjeta, Hrvatski narod, Novo Doba, Obzor, Vienac, Nada, Pokret.
27 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 10, File Nr. 1716-1996, 772-1915, July 5, 1915.
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on King’s Commesar Skerlecz. He managed to cross over to Serbia with a col-
league Marijan Jakšić with help from representatives of Croatian-Serbian Co-
alition Većeslav Wilder and dr. Živko Bertić. The same as for Luka Jukić, meet-
ings in “National defense”, offices of „Unity or death“ organization and “Slavic 
South” newspapers redaction had been organized for Hercigonja. Also, Her-
cigonja made effort to organize release of Luka Jukić from prison. In difference 
to Jukić’s assassination attempt, this action failed. Investigation revealed that 
he had demanded from representative of Croatian-Serbian Coalition Wilder to 
intervene at Count Tisza for Jukić’s release. All in all, Wilder supported them 
financially and suggested dr. Bertić to help them with release form for crossing 
to Serbia in the end. He gave them 100 Kruna for the trip. State Attorney office 
stated Wilder had paid financial contribution to “National defense” in 1911.
Even tough aforementioned claims were sufficient enough to open crimi-
nal investigation against Wilder, he was protected by Immunity of Croatian 
Parliament and Joint Parliament in Budapest. State bodies limited themselves 
in following him while dr. Živan Bertić was taken into detention in 1915, un-
der suspicion of committing a criminal offense of high treason. Criminal pro-
cess has been pending in 1915, until Land Government in Zagreb suggested 
suspension of investigation against Wilder and Bertić. Contextualization of 
Bertić’s activities enables cognition of complexity of social-political processes 
in the last years of Austria-Hungary. In applying comparative methodology, it 
is particularly interesting to regard Živko Bertić’s beliefs before and after the 
war, experiencing life in a new state: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
His pre-war belief in so called national unity is revealed in acts and events he 
had participated in along with the consequences he bare as a result of it. His 
post-war tranformation was not affected by shere displeasure of his personal 
status. It is clear Bertić acted according to his beliefs all of his life based on 
events that took place. For that reason, I shall cite part of his text published in 
Sriemese Croatian Journal in 1926. Knowledge about the new state character 
had been confirmed by then. Bertić had convinced himself upon it and wrote: 
“Without a doubt we have come across Great Serbia with National unity idea, 
whereas we or our ancestors Croatians did not wish to go, now having nothing 
left over but to return to Croatian state right viewpoint. The idea of national 
unity in this form had been executed dishonestly and unfairly, at the expense 
of Croats and Slovenes, and cannot be corrected in this form. As long as our 
centralized Government represents extended Serbia, we cannot speak of state 
politics in the spirit of Yugoslav idea or spirit of national unity or equality of all 
our national and state politics factors, but state politics will be led in the spirit 
and traditions of great-serbianism alone. It is an axiom needless to argue about 
today. Idea of national unity is a weapon of our enemies today who dispute us, 
therefore for that simple reason, it cannot be ours any longer.”28
28 Zlata Gvozdić-Filjak, Juraj Lončarević, Srijemska kalvarija Hrvata [Srijem Calvary of Croats], 
(Zagreb, 1995), pp. 112-113.
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The text hereinmentioned is interesting for the fact that by analyzing it, we 
are in a position to comprehend idea concept of national unity from genesis, 
a genesis which influenced Bertić’s pre-war beliefs and actions up to complete 
cognition.
For that it is convenient to remind, that it is not about the evaluation of the 
idea but how much it’s application in total, had suitable character in certain 
period and in relation to certain national groups and areas where it has been 
applied to.
Therefore it is possible to understand beliefs of one part of Croatian po-
litical and social elites in pre-war period. It is clear how their expectations 
contradicted the character of new state, which they had helped to build. They 
have been in illusion for years. They have supported this idea concept by acts, 
and in that manner influenced Croatian state forming future and territories 
upon which they had to take consideration as people’s representatives, espe-
cially security context of pre-war and war state of affairs. They acted exactly the 
opposite way ie. with their public and secret activity, they weakened not only 
security situation in Austria-Hungary but also Croatian stateforming thought 
respectively.
National deputy Živko Bertić from Srijem acted identically. Therefore, 
based on his experince and ideological thesis he represented, which he had 
abandonded and returned to repeatedly, it is possible to comprehend com-
plexity of period reflected most in unfathomableness of political processes in 
which individual, even being member of parlimanet, was not in a condition to 
judge them in a right way. On the contrary, exactly behind the scenes, policy 
and complex process of internal and foreign affairs, led advocates of Croatian 
state right to opposite conceptions. Furhtermore, it made them instrument for 
implementation of opposite interests, interests they will comprehend them-
selves couple of years later too.  
Caotic outbreak of war
Notwithstanding the fact mobilisation required time, up to 16 days by 
Conrad von Hötzendorf (Chief of General staff of Austro-Huungarian army), 
minister of foreign affairs Leopold Berhtold insisted upon offensive attack on 
Serbia immediatelly upon receving results of investigation of Sarajevo assas-
sination. 27th of July 1914, had been set as a first day of alert and July 28, as a 
first day of partial mobilization.29 Actual mobilization had started on July 24, 
29 Željko Pleskalt (ed.), Ratni dnevnik C. K. Varaždinske pješačke pukovnije br. 16, translated by 
Danijela Marjanić [War diary of Varaždin infantery regiment Central Command Nr. 16, 26th of 
July 1914 - 29th of January 1915], (Bjelovar, 2004); HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 867, Nr. 4551-6404, 
Nr. 4286, Annex, July 25, 1914, Telegram to Land Government in Zagreb from Hungarian land 
defense minister.
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1914. On that day, minister of defense sent mobilization drafts, which were 
delivered to military conscripts on 25th and 26th of July 1914.30 8 military dis-
tricts were mobilized and divided in 6 armies of unequal strenght. Archduke 
Friedrich was Supreme commander of operative forces while Franz Conrad 
von Hötzendorf was chief of general staff of the army.31 All actions had been 
finished thus allowing minister Berchtold to, on the ground of Imperial au-
thorization, co-sing declaration of war on July 28, 1914 which was proclaimed 
to all nations of the Monarchy the same day.32  Conrad’s estimates about time 
needed for mobilization proven to be correct, although war was declared on 
July 28, 1914 and Serbian Army blew up a bridge between Zemun and Bel-
grade on July 29 already, it took more time to commence hostilities.
Relating outbreak of war in Croatia, omissions of pre-war period, in the 
terms of repelling activities inspired from many Serbian military, political 
and social circles, had to be removed in very short notice. Furhtermore, ques-
tion of responsibility of Croatian Ban and Minister-President Tisza had oc-
cured. However, it was just an acute question. Events unfolded in great speed, 
alongside the process of gaining infulence on Monarchy level. Croatian Ban 
Ivan Skerlecz, who had influence as much as his political mentor Count Tisza 
could provide one, had been disorientated in the first days of war only until 
the moment Tisza acquired maximum confidence of Emperor Francis Joseph. 
Altough Tisza managed to fight himself through for this infulence in very 
short notice so he could protect Skerlecz, the fact remains Skerlecz was left by 
himself during period from Sarajevo assasination until first days of war. Not 
even Tisza could provide him support for which he needed to fight for from 
the Emperor personally. If we analyse this fact in the context of complex daily 
events: demonstrations, parliamnetary debates, adjustment of peace time con-
ditions to the state of war, it is evident to what extent politically undercapable 
Skerlecz, left to himself, have had panic reactions. Altough he permamnently 
claimed Serbian population was loyal, he requested military aid at the same 
time. Revelation about loyalty of Serbian population in Triune Kingdom, spe-
cially referred to Srijem population.33
The presence of the army understandably created sense of security in this 
period. County officials requested intervention from Ban on many occasions at 
military headquarters because of military presence in their areas. For example, 
the head of County for Nova Gradiška had elaborated his request for military 
aid in the fact that area of his authority consisted of 40%  Serbian population 
30 Đuro Šurmin, “Preparations for war with Serbia”, Novosti [Novelties], Nr. 84, March 23, 1927, 2.
31 Slavko Pavičić, Hrvatska vojna i ratna poviest i Prvi svjetski rat [Croatian warfare and military 
history and World War One], (Zagreb, 1943), pp. 247-250.
32 Josip Horvat, Prvi svjetski rat. Panorama zbivanja 1914-1918. [World War One], (Zagreb, 
1967), p. 127.
33 Isidor (Iso) Kršnjavi, Zapisci. Iza kulisa hrvatske politike [Writtings – behind the scenes of 
Croatian politics], vol. II, (Zagreb, 1986), p. 735.
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and by relocating other interned persons from border territory would present 
probable cause of further destabilization of situation.34 
Sense of security or, rather, insecurity, influenced Ban Skerlecz. In a meet-
ing at Zagreb military headquarters held right after the defeat in the battle of 
Cer35, Skerlecz had warned about possible rebellion of Serbian population in 
areas where they have formed majority. For that reason, he requested troops 
from military command. Zagreb military command representative rejected 
the request with a warning that in case of a riot, military will not only suppress 
it but take over administration of entire country as well.36  
So, military protection had a price. Ban Skerlecz had been invited to meet-
ings with joint Zagreb military commander Eugen Scheuer, handling joint 
tasks during first months of war. Although this cooperation put him in a sub-
ordinate position, he gave his consent expecting aid and avoiding conflicts 
with the army. On self-consciousness of military authorities record shows that 
Zagreb military commander issued a warrant on August 7, 1914 for taking all 
necessary measures for the purpose of restoring order among population. It is 
mentioned that even in the case of minimal offense, they should act with “un-
scrupulous energy” (“mit der rücksichtslosesten Energie”) for which he got all 
means necessary and help from supreme command of the army.37 
Skerlecz demanded from Zagreb military command reinforcement of 
constabulary stations, especially in border areas. In the same time, they had 
informed him that minister of war instructed Hungarian Minister-President 
to secure reinforcement of border guards to protect railroads, bridges and 
other important objects. The order reffered to guarding bridges over Danube, 
Petrovaradin tunnel, bridge over Sava near Zemun, all bridges at Zagreb, Brod, 
Jasenovac, bridge over Kupa near Sisak with the ones near Varaždin and Osijek 
respectively. Special warning was issued for arms smuggling and control of 
Serbian fugitive’s crossings. It is determined that constabulary needs assistance 
from troops.38 
34 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 867, Nr. 4551-6404, File Nr. 280, September 25, 1914.
35 In battle of Cer, Austro-Hungarian and Serbian army engaged in combat for the first time. 
In armed conflict which lasted from 16th until 19th of August 1914, Austro-Hungarian army 
suffered failure and retreated to staging points on west bank of Drina river. That way, Serbian 
forces prevented Austro-Hungarian army to occupy Serbia at the beginning of war, according 
to Central Powers military strategists intentions, to be able to strike Russia afterwards. Austro-
Hungarian army under Potiorek leadership counted 200 000 soldiers against 180 000 Serbian 
soldiers under command of Stepa Stepanović. XIII corps participated in the battle also. See: 
S. Pavičić, Hrvatska vojna i ratna poviest, pp. 278-284, Milan Zelenika, Prvi svjetski rat 1914. 
[World War One 1914], (Belgrade, 1962), pp. 443-452. 
36 I. Kršnjavi, Zapisci (…), vol. II, p. 735.
37 Ibid, p. 735.
38 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr. 2745, July 20, 1914.
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From the above stated, it is evident that commencement of hostilities 
found Ban Skerlecz unready. Notwithstanding the fact he had political support 
of Hungarian Government, first days of war and period followed immediately 
after Sarajevo assassination, Skerlecz did not have political influence to resolve 
issues personally. In this period, military commander had greatest influence 
in Croatia. Ban had requested for help from him, confident army may secure 
restoring order more efficiently.39 
Thus apparent weakness of civil authority in Croatia made main headquar-
ters of the army consider as opportunity to take over administration of the 
country, not paying attention to laws and civil representatives. We should defi-
nitely add to this fact certain unexperienced of civil authorities, who did not 
know the true value of laws in war conditions and whether circumstances will 
allow them their application in reality. On the other hand, army might have 
confidence in their man at the top of civil administration alone. They intended 
to do so by replacing Ivan Skerlecz and appointing general Adolf Rhemen as 
King’s Commissioner for Croatia.40  
However, events that took place unfolded in civil authorities’ favor. Let us 
remember that powers Croatian Ban had received from Francis Joseph, en-
abled him in taking over execution of exceptional measures for the case of war. 
According to plain regulations, Ban Skerlecz substituted the King for their ex-
ecution, thus making vertical chain of command set up differently, especially 
after Tisza gained influence on Monarchy level. From herein mentioned, it is 
clear that the power of military authorities diminuend in very short notice.  
Not much time was also needed to set up different regulations for the ter-
ritory of Triune Kingdom. The source of political power with its reflecting ef-
fect on military issues laid in jurisdiction of Hungarian Government who sent 
orders to Land Government in Zagreb constantly and Land Government in 
Zagreb had put them through forward to government commissioners in coun-
ties, districts, constabularies and regimental outposts respectively.41 
Within this established relationship, Skerlecz had a task of executing Hun-
garian Government’s policy. Few months later when he had become familiar 
with the situation more closely and when support from Hungary had become 
more guaranteed, he showed more audacity in confronting military demands. 
Notwithstanding war and unstable political and security situation, soon after 
39 HR-HDA-78, PLG, 78, Box 867, Nr. 4551-6404, File Nr. 5217, Annex 1914, August 11, 1914.
40 Most of Croatian population in military terms had been organized in XIII military corps 
which consisted of 36th and 7th infantry division and 42nd landwehr division. Headquarters 
was in Zagreb and Adolf Rhemen was commanding general.
41 HR-HDA-77, Kraljevski ministar hrvatsko-slavonsko-dalmatinski u Budimpešti [King’s Cro-
atian-Slavonian-Dalmatian Minister, Presidium], Box 49, File Nr. 279, 442-1914, Budapest, Au-
gust 10, 1914. Due to safer communication of Land Government and Hungarian Government in 
Budapest, department counsellor Emil Grabarić took over from state secretary in Croatian Min-
istry in Budapest Dragutina Unkelhäussera keys for coding and decoding of official telegraphs.  
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it was clear that political stability of Government and position of Skerlecz were 
not endangered. It did not take long for Skerlecz political opponents to witness 
the fact. They were members of Party of right, followers of Josip Frank policy.
However, they didn’t quit and considered that war situation offers oppor-
tunity for political change with a help from main headquarters of the army 
and leading Austro-Hungarian generals. Evidently, this support had not been 
sufficient to remove Ban Skerlecz from office. 
Aforementioned relationship between Skerlecz and Zagreb military com-
mand lasted until the moment Hungarian Minister-President Tisza estimated 
he had enough influence to oppose main headquarters of the army. The turn-
ing point had presented the meeting in Budapest on August 13, 1914. Among 
other leading politicians and Skerlecz, representatives of Southern Command 
of the army also participated. They had agreed upon the following: “Pre-emp-
tive imprisonment Hungarian laws do not allow, but in state of emergency, 
extraordinary measures may be applied for the security of the state. If con-
crete cases of doubt are needed to be brought up, government commission-
ers must determine detention. Still, if military commanders, except for most 
urgent matters, would be forced to detain individuals without consensus of 
civil authorities, they have to take care of everything and take all responsibility 
on themselves as well as all costs of transport. With detained persons must be 
treated with accord 1) who misbehaved military laws, to hand over to military 
tribunals, 2) who misbehaved in that matter to hand them over to civil courts, 
to hand over to attorney general, 3) for whom there is only a doubt, but no 
concrete evidence, place of internship to determine from case to case.”42 
In that meeting certain independency for Land Government in Zagreb was 
secured, so from then forward, Skerlecz had obliged less and less to military 
command, especially in the matter of difficult cases. He intended to undermine 
their requests and act upon his judgements and Hungarian Government com-
mands. All the same, military command had “overloaded” him with various 
reports for high treason based on informant’s testimonies. Moreover, Scheure 
had summoned Ban to act “most rigorously to unreliable and anti-state el-
ements from Pakrac surroundings” what Skerlecz declined with explanation 
that all these requests were unjustified so there is no reason to act accordingly. 
Scheure did not satisfy himself with that answer so he wrote to Ban repeatedly, 
moreover demanding: “that for the sake of loyal citizens, unreliable officials 
need to be transferred (...) For that reason I plead to take in consideration se-
riously whether Government Commissioner, who does not enjoy confidence 
of the loyal people, is match for his duty. I must for the sake of security of this 
area of command, be able to rely unconditionally on all government bodies as 
well”.43
42 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 5346, August 17, 1914.
43 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr. 764, August 19, 1914.
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Events, i.e. the character of armed combat that followed soon after in 
Srijem area, confirmed judgements of Austro-Hungarian generals and their 
desire to prevent what will truly take place: multiple support from Serbian 
population of Srijem to Serbian Army and exceptionally aggressive acts toward 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers.
War in Srijem
In the plans of Main Headquarters of Austro-Hungarian Army regarding 
attack on Serbia, only offensive actions from Croatian territory, needed to be 
taken from border area, were from Srijem. For that reason, military commands 
from Srijem and Slavonia took extensive preparations to secure military ac-
tions on Serbia which started on August 12, 1914 with crossing of the 5th Army 
over Drina and 2nd Army over Sava respectively.44 Regarding geostrategic im-
portance of Srijem, military authorities, just before the declaration of war, in-
tended to secure help from civil administration, elaborated in the text above. 
Zagreb military command with consensus of the Land Government issued a 
memorandum on July 20, 1914 about surveillance of suspicion individuals and 
all Serbian societies from Zemun, Mitrovica and Brod.45 They acted upon in-
telligence information. Constabulary in Srijemski Karlovci had been ordered 
to, with help from military, perform raid of suspicious persons regardless of 
their status afterwards. Surveillance of all Serbian societies from Srijem had 
been conducted accordingly. Action was executed on July 26, 1914. The next 
day already, military command in Petrovaradin on the ground of Article 481 
of Military criminal offenders Law, had proclaimed martial law for Petrovar-
adin fortress and places: Majur, Ljudevitovdol, Rokovdol, Bukovac, Karlovci, 
Kamenica i Fruška Gora. Until that day, all activities were coordinated with 
commands from Land Government and on July 28, 1914 already Command 
in Petrovaradin ordered to constabulary detention of suspicious individuals 
by telephone.46 The arrests had been carried out with help from constabulary 
and Land Government had been informed about it that 43 persons had been 
arrested.47 Among them, there had been members of Parliament Giga Jović, 
Anatolij Janković and Nikola Petrović.48
Since the arrests were carried out without Government consent, Skerlecz 
was left to protest that arrested persons did not belong under jurisdiction of 
military criminal responsibility and that military commands should have con-
tacted civil authorities in these cases. He had interceded in behalf of arrested 
44 S. Pavičić, Hrvatska vojna i ratna poviest (…), p. 281.
45 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr. 2740, August 20, 1914.
46 HR-HDA-833, OF. Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 63-1914, Srijemski Karlovci, July 31, 1914.
47 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 867, Nr. 4551-6404, File Nr. 63, Srijemski Karlovci, July 28, 1914.
48 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, article “Hostages in Srijem in the year of 1914”, 2-3.
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members of Parliament with Tisza, demanding their release.49 He failed to ac-
quire release so question of their detention became actual. Confident that their 
stay in Croatia might have led to further damage due to communication with 
their like-minders and relatives, Skerlecz contacted Hungarian Government. 
They arranged the relocation of prisoners on Hungarian territory.50 By ana-
lyzing the aforementioned case, it is clear Ban had agreed to inforce military 
commands only declaratory, while intending to alleviate their negative effects 
simultaneously. Skerlecz had indulged military requests but in a special man-
ner. He didn’t remove the suspects but relocated them. He was finding numer-
ous ways to avoid literal application of everyday military requests. Contrary 
to military authority’s projections about necessary protection for mobilized 
troops, Skerlecz was deciding independently using the institute of civil author-
ity, often opposite to military command plans. Of course, his interventions in 
military affairs had disrupted tactic and strategic plans of Main Headquarters.
What orders Ban was receiving from military commands in general? Two 
examples are sufficient: One relates to Oscar Potiorek request from August 
12, 1914. Potiorek was holding a duty of commander of 6th Army which had 
been the integral part of the Balkan Army. He introduced Ban about un-loyal 
Serbian stance in Srijem and demanded disband of principality councils, dis-
charge of Serbians from post offices, railroads and tax offices, evacuation of 
suspicious persons, securing of hostages for railroad, post offices and military 
armory, limitation of movement and transfer for police officers of Serbian na-
tionality.51 Skerlecz attitude toward credibility of these reports or, rather, his 
doubts about military judgements, can be evident from the fact that he have 
sent Francis Haladi, altogether with great Mayor Hideghety, to Srijem with a 
task to review the situation. In case these notices turn out to be true, he would 
have concurred with resolutions suggested by Armeekommande. 52
Another example is the case with local commander in Zemun, Colonel 
Gustav Globočnik who 
Was instated by the Ban to replace constables of Serbian nationality with 
members of Zagreb constabulary during the war with Serbia.53 
From archive material it is evident to what extent Hungarian Minister-
President Istvan Tisza had possessed more political talent, pragmatism and 
resoluteness in context of political acting. Tisza did not minorize the influence 
of Serbian population from Srijem area which is evident from his apeal to or-
thodox priesthood charged to use their influence among Serbian population 
49 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 815, Nr. 257-7223, Ruma, August 13, 1914.
50 Bogdan Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski odnosi [Croatia in 
World War One. Croatian-Serbian political relations], (Zagreb, 1989), p. 100.
51 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 6514, September 21, 1914.
52 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 6514, September 21, 1914.
53 HR-HDA-78, PLG, 78, Box 831, 234/1914, Zemun, October 22, 1914.
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on Tisza incentive. Tisza had resented episcope’s Miron Nikolić Serbian stance 
“who live here for 200 years already”, yet still displeased with their status. He had 
suggested Church can influence attitudes and tempers of Serbian population.54 
Serbian Army breakthrough into Srijem
Not much time passed away to comprehend what Austro-Hungarian com-
mand had in mind suggesting the beforementioned measures. During the 
end of August and beginning of September, after first combats and defeat of 
Austro-Hungarian Army in the battle of Cer, first regrouping of forces and re-
organization of units had taken place. Oskar Potiorek had decided to organize 
new corps in Srijem under command of general Alfred Krauss whom he had 
appointed as commander of 29th infantry division as a part of Army Group 
Petrovaradin and 5th Army. Precisely this division had a task to protect Sava. 
Although Krauss have had an opinion that Serbian Army crossing over Sava 
should not been expected, it nonetheless happened.55 Serbian gunnery com-
menced bombardment of Mitrovica on 26th of August 1914 and on the 28th 
August already, First and Second Serbian Army had crossed Sava.56  Crossing 
of Serbian Army into Srijem was experienced with great excitement in Serbia. 
In introduction of Piemont had been written: “Great are the days we had expe-
rienced. The dream became a reality. Plain Srijem and once upon a time Ser-
bian Vojvodina become part of Great Serbia. Whole leadership from Timok to 
Adriatic consider this day as the beginning of creation of Great Serbia. August 
28. This is a great date in our history. This is the day Serbian troops occupied 
wonderful Srijem plain along all of river Sava”.57  Serbian Army kept possession 
of Srijem until Spetember 13, when general Radomir Putnik58, after the battles 
of Kraljevica and Batajnica, had decided to retreat.59 
54 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 5139/1914, August 31, 1914.
55 Alfred Kraus, Uzroci našeg poraza (…), pp. 157-160.
56 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 865, Nr. 79-4096, File Nr. 361, Annex – 1914.
57 “Belgrade and Zemun”, Piemont (Belgrade), Nr. 215, August 29, 1914, 1.
58 Radomir Putnik (Kragujevac, 24th of January 1847 – 17th of May 1917) chief of staff in 
Headquarters of Serbian army in World War One. Military education acquired at Artillery 
School in Belgrade. Chief of staff of the army since 1903. Together with Živojin Mišić, prepared 
all military plans for Balkan wars and armed combat fightings during World War One. In period 
between 1912 until 1916, he was Quartermaster General. After the battle of Kumanovo, he be-
came first Serbian Archduke (Vojvoda). In 1916 he left island of Krf and went on medical treat-
ment in Nice where he died next year. He delt with theory of warfare and wrote books Služba 
generalštaba I and II, Služba u mirno doba and Služba u ratno doba [Headquarters service I and 
II, Service in peace time and Service in war time]. See: Dimitrije Đorđević, Portaits from newer 
Serbian history, Beograd, 1997; Svetozar Pribićević, Diktatura kralja Aleksandra [Dictatorship of 
King Alexander], (Belgrade, 1952).
59 M. Zelenika, Prvi svjetski rat, pp. 633-635; HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 865, Nr. 79-4096, File Nr. 
361, Annex – 1914.
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Herein mentioned breakthrough of Serbian army is described in State At-
torney reports in Zagreb. Oscar Potiorek had informed Skerlecz about events 
in Srijem He reminded him of declaration while taking over the command 
of the area and Ban’s obligation to provide aid to the army. About the extent 
of Serbian breakthrough into Srijem and Serbian population’s attitude to-
ward this event, Potiorek found out only after sending headquarters major 
Bartl in inspection who, after his survey, had filled a report describing how: 
“Serbian-orthodox population is hostile to our army. In Serbian villages, they 
have been shooting on our troops and Serbian soldiers have been hiding in 
their homes and redress in civilian clothes. Local population destroyed tele-
graph, telephone and railway lines. They gave signals to the enemy by night. 
In some places, they have received Serbian army ceremoniously, marking 
Serbian houses with Cyrillic letter and green wreaths to spare their houses 
from Serbian army while houses of Catholics were burned down even by local 
population”. On the ground of that report, Potiorek consistently demanded 
from main headquarters of the army and Croatian Ban removal of unreliable 
persons from counties, municipality offices, post-offices, telegraph, railroad, 
tax and forest offices along with evacuation of all orthodox monasteries and 
removal of water guards.60
Military report had been confirmed by State Attorney based upon infor-
mation of county commissioners. The most detailed report composed county 
commissioner from Vukovar. He had described the event: “The retreat of our 
army, local Serbs follow with mocking smile and prepare special delegation 
right away, to salute Serbian army ceremoniously in front of the village. Del-
egations are someplace smaller someplace bigger, the biggest in Dobanovci, 
whereas half of inhabitant Serbs depart to meet Serbian army. In Deč and Kupi-
novo, local pharoses and notaries are in delegations. On local houses they hang 
Serbian flags and on themselves they put Serbian cockades. While the army is 
entering, all bells ring. Home Serbs accept Serbian army overjoyed, cheer to 
the army and King Peter, throw flowers and decorate it with wreaths. In Deč, 
Dobanovci and Kupinovo ceremonial services to God take place and prays for 
the glory for victory of Serbian arms (...) Home Serbs treat and provide hospi-
tality for Serbian army overjoyed, to their benefit in everything: showing roads 
to neighboring villages and paths where our army retreated and tipping off 
about every movement of our army. Home Serbs kill our soldiers who were left 
behind: in Bečmen commander of the company and seven soldiers, in Ašanja, 
Deč and Ugrinovci by one soldier and in Kupinovo they point a hideout to 
Serbian army, where 250 of our soldiers hid and who where made prisoners of 
war upon it (...) Home Serbs give over to Serbian army distinguishable non-
Serbs and demand from them to kill them. And army does kill in Boljevci six 
men, in Dobanovci thirteen (...) Home Serbs under leadership of municipal 
60 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr. 494, September 18, 1914; HR-HDA-78, 
PLG, Box 865, Nr. 79-4096, File Nr. 457 -1914, Annex – 1914, September 17, 1914.
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officials and servicemen perform requisition of non-Serbs for Serbian army. 
Mostly alone, but exceptionally accompanied by few Serbian soldiers, home 
Serbs break into their own and neighboring villages – in Batajnica furthermore 
under leadership of municipal official – in houses of non-Serbs thus plunder-
ing them and burn them afterwards.” Countermeasures of Austro-Hungarian 
army are described in the report after their return: „In village, soldiers who 
where left over, our army had captured and under martial law main quilties 
and ring leaders sentenced to death and others released. Against many the pro-
cedure is still pending. One was shot in Ažanja, 11 in Batajnica, 3 in Bečmen, 
1 in Bežanija, 5 in Boljevci, 4 in Progar, 2 in Deč, 10 in Dobanovci, 6 in Jakov, 
17 in Karlovčić, 1 in Petrovčić, 5 in Kupinovo, 11 in Obreža, 1 in Pečinci, 9 in 
Popinci, 2 in Prhova, 10 in Surčin, 5 in Šimanovci and 2 in Ugrinovci”.61
Against persons who had helped Serbian army in any way during their 
brief breakthrough, criminal proceedings were being initiated, depending on 
criminal act they have committed. That way against ones who committed bur-
glary, arson, and public violence against the state, and those were 350, criminal 
procedures were initiated for indemnities to the state and repaying damages 
to private persons.62 In other group there had been 595 persons accused of 
high treason. Criminal procedure had been initiated against many officials too. 
For example, in possession of county official in Ruma, Kangrga –mobilization 
plans had been found. Upon all accused of high treason, sentence of shoot-
ing was executed. Those were the consequences of Serbian breakthrough into 
Srijem.
Regarding activities of local Serbian population during Serbian army 
“breakthrough”, military commander Scheure in Zagreb had summoned Ban 
Skerlecz. He sent him a notice with following content: “As I know from Your 
Excellency, Srijem valued as loyal and some officials not without objection at 
all have been in favour of mobilization right away. But, what happened with 
this reliability, sad facts have shown (...) And that all of that had been in Srijem, 
which You considered reliable, how would it look like in those counties during 
invasion, which have been stigmatized as friendly to Serbs or unsecure? Excel-
lency, our duty is to be together at work. Politics are strange to me, but this is 
not a question of politics, we stand before villains’ attacks on our country”.63 
Skerlecz had persisted notwithstanding non-confidence regarding situation 
from his first associate, under-Ban Aurel Fodroczy, person in charge of Inte-
rior section of Land Government, therefore in charge of constabulary as well 
and security situation in the country accordingly. Zagreb military command 
had warned Skerlecz on Fodroczy statement that civil authorities release sus-
pects from prison because they don’t have proof material for criminal prosecu-
tion and according to procedure they should have handed them over to court 
61 HR-HDA-79, IDLG-CDIS, Box 28, Nr. 483/Annex-1916.
62 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 87, Annex 1914, Spetember 6, 1914.
63 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr.1764, September 26, 1914.
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martial. In the report composed on the basis of anonymous tip, it was stated: 
„Yet in Zagreb will come to these occasions as it did in Srijem (...) that soldiers 
are not allowed to tell anything about the army and their comrades, while Serb 
vice Ban Fodroczy is allowed to express himself openly like this: “Everything 
is doomed, we are beaten on all lines! There are many Serbs in Zagreb. If, God 
forsake, Serbs would arrive in Zagreb, they would have been greeted the same 
way as they had been in Srijem, especially few days before the have been in 
Zemun”. The ending of memorandum is remarkable:  “Be mindful esteemed 
one and put coalition under more tight guard. Loyal to Dinasty.”64  
How did public opinion accept unfavorable news from Sirjem we got in-
sight from Zagreb Archbishop Bauer’s diary: “We hear about Serbian break-
throughs on Srijem soil near Mitrovica, Kupinovo and Zemun. Not to mention 
how much these issues touch us deep and in the bottom of our soul. Nobody 
has the will for the job, everyone grab newspapers in which nothing is there, 
just phrases, to hide upheavals as better as possible and in all those official 
news the only comfort is – hope for the better.” From the same reading we 
comprehend how certain informations notwithstanding military censorship, 
could have come to public. Archbishop’s secretary mentions that they have 
found out about the armed combats in Srijem from Italian Press Osservatore 
Romano ie. the newspaper censorship had left through due to the election of 
new Pope.65
Evacuation of population
Familiar with aforementioned events we are in condition to comprehend 
discontent of officers who had demanded more complete cooperation to be 
taken with civil authorities. Previously, I have exposed the concept of multiple 
disunity on political and social level. Disunity and non-coordination had been 
expressed to such measure, that Tisza’s close associates disagreed in estimates 
and actions. I mentioned appointment of Baron Tallian as Commissioner of 
Hungarian Government for South Tyrol military command. Skerlecz was 
Tisza’s confident too, so it was logical to assume at least two commissioners 
would implement similar procedures. However, in this case also it had been 
the opposite way. Consensus had been left out. 
Herein stated claim I explain on the ground of discord between Skerlecz 
and Tallian after Serbian army retreat. Events have showed them it is not pos-
sible to avoid implementation of measures which military authorities priory 
demanded from civil bodies such as evacuation of population, suspension of 
bureaucrats or taking of hostages. Then Tallian, although he did not have the 
64 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File Nr. 1711, September 22, 1914.
65 Nadbiskupijski arhiv u Zagrebu (hereinafter: NAZ) [Archbishopry Archive in Zagreb], Leg-
acy of Archbishop Antun Bauer, Dnevnik [Diary], Vol. II,  September 6 – 8, 1914.
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mandate for determining hostages, had started to implement exactly these 
measures without knowledge and consent of Croatian Land Government. 
His command for suspension of certain number of officials Skerlecz had op-
posed with a warning that such decisions under war laws, lay in jurisdiction 
of King’s commissioner and his lawful representatives, therefore in this field 
and about this decision prerogative holds Mayor Hideghéthy.66 Ban could have 
really relied on commissioner Hideghethy. He had delivered him information 
about Srijem at all times such as number of arrested, interned and people ex-
empted as hostages. Most intensive and, by content of the conversation, most 
disputable relationships between civil and military authorities had been on 
the question of hostages. For that reason, representatives of Land Government 
and Hungarian Minister-President Tisza had participated in a meeting with 
representatives of Potiorek military command in Brčko on October 5, 1914. 
Government representatives had emphasized that taking of hostages is illegal 
and demanded that army, since conducting it already, financially support the 
evacuation of population. General Alfred Kraus had suggested establishment 
of contribution as a guaranty the damage will be repaid actually. Tisza had 
rejected Krauss’ suggestion with explanation that in his country contribution 
will not be inforced, because contribution is due to be implemented in en-
emy country only. He had opposed Krauss suggestion with a legal norm under 
which for compensation of damage, only convicted perpetrator of a criminal 
offence is sufficient.67 Meanwhile, he had warned that activities of Croatian 
Land Government in relation to military obligations, should reduce to help in 
combat, security of army transport and supply. Furthermore, he had explained 
how military commands have jurisdiction over individuals in any relation with 
military obligation only, thus belonging under jurisdiction of military tribu-
nal. In other cases, army had not had the right to intervene. At the same time 
he had reminded army acts exceeded determined frames and in future should 
the same be executed by civil administration only i.e. legally elected Govern-
ment.68
Altough Tisza’s suggestions had goal to resolve the relationship between 
civil and military authorities, irregularities happened even afterwards. It had 
made army more resilient in inforcing plans. These days, Skerlecz had received 
telegrams from his confidents in which they have informed him about numer-
ous arrests and evacuations from Srijem.69  
In memorandum from Požega commissioner it is mentioned that “around 
2000 members of Greek-Eastern religion, banished as a dangerous element 
from Srijem” arrive in Požega. Government commissioner finds large number 
66 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 1141, February 8, 1915.
67 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24,  File Nr. 7697, October 18, 1914.
68 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24, File  Nr. 7697, October 18, 1914.
69 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 877, Nr. 7.789, telegrams to Presidency of Land Government from 
Batajnica, Osijek and Požega.
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of inhabitants of Serbian nationality in villages of Požega county as a secu-
rity problem too. Due to a large increase in number of Serbian population, 
Mayor had requested from Ban establishment of Constabulary Commission 
in Požega.”70 
County district in Osijek had informed Presidency of Land Government 
in Zagreb on November 26, 1914 about relocation of 7856 Serbs from Srijem 
to Virovitica area too.
They had been accommodated in homes of local Serbian population. Al-
though being accepted benevolent, in time, their numericity had created prob-
lem, especially regarding food shortages and other necessities.71 Besides that, 
large number of persons had been lived in one household, so there have been 
danger of development of pandemonium. All of these circumstances caused 
discontent with local and evacuated population, so authorities had estimated 
that rebellion might broke out in the County. Therefore, in the Land Govern-
ment they had suggested formation of „joint camps of evacuated persons and 
plunder of funds for nutrition for in that way all would carry the burdens”.72 
In conclusion of discussion about evacuation of Serbian population from 
Srijem area it is necessary to pay attention to few facts. Most of all, it is evident 
how Croatian Government had accommodated population herein mentioned 
in other parts of Croatia and taken care of their nutrition and life conditions. 
Interned persons have not been accommodated in camps but in private per-
sons lodgings and farms across Croatia. For example, for one part of interned 
persons, Zagreb county district have taken care and accommodated them on 
dr. Bogdan Medaković estate.73 Other interned persons had been accommo-
dated in Krapina, Ivanac, Ludbreg, Koprivnica, Samobor etc.74
Purpose of internship had revealed itself in protection of combat activ-
ity, so it lasted according to estimates about endangerment of military units. 
When the danger ceased to exist for Austro-Hungarian army, Land Govern-
ment had started implementation of return for interned persons.75 
Possible intentions of Main headquarters of the army are evident from 
archive material, after experienced gained from connected events, more pre-
cisely analysis regarding relocation of Serbian population from Srijem. We are 
not in position to confirm the herein mentioned statement because I had ac-
quired information about it indirectly. Namely, Mayor of Osijek dr. Pinterović, 
handed over Osijek military command plans to Zagreb Archbishop Antun 
70 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 831, 409/1914, Požega, September 26, 1914.
71 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 35, September 26, 1914.
72 HR-HDA-833, PF, Đuro Šurmin, Box 27, File Nr. 35, November 26, 1914.
73 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 870, Nr. 6328, Zagreb, July 14, 1915.
74 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 870, Nr. 4872, Samobor, July 24, 1915.
75 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 887, Nr. 3287/1-1915, January 18, 1916.
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Bauer secretary dr. Svetozar Rittig76 that in border area with Serbia “under any 
circumstances Slavic peoples must not live together, either Croats nor Slovaks”. 
Rittig had concluded: “This shows direction upon which colonization of Sri-
jem will take place”.77  
However, tendentious debates had started in daily press about interments 
already. Croatian defense from Osijek had published a minute book of a meet-
ing on which it had been decided about interments from south Srijem. As 
Pokret, Hrvatska, Hrvat and Bosnische Post had quoted the article, Grand May-
or Hideghethy warned Ban about omissions that took place during censorship 
with a remark: “Maybe polemic as well as censorship is in the hands of some 
coalitionist”.78  Intention of publicist works had been accusation of Austro-
Hungarian army witnessed in titles of newspaper articles like “Horrors in 
Srijem in the year 1914”79, “Hostages in Srijem”80 and “Pogroms in Croatia”.81 
76 Svetozar Rittig (Brod na Savi, 1873 – Zagreb, 21st of July 1961), priest, historian and politi-
cian. Studied theology in Sarajevo, Đakovo, Vienna and Rom. Ordained for priest in 1895. For 
some time he was Archbishop Strossmayer’s secretary accepting his political ideas. He lectured 
Church history in Đakovo and at Theology Faculty in Zagreb. He was the editor of Catholic 
journal. In 1902 he received Doctorate degree in Vienna. Close associate of Zagreb Archbishop 
Antun Bauer and his personal secretary respectively. Appointed Mayor of Saint Blaise Parish 
in 1915, and from 1917 until 1941 Mayor of St. Mark’s Parish. With help of Ivan Meštrović and 
Jozo Kljaković artistically reconstruct church of St. Mark on Mark Square in Zagreb. As a fol-
lower of Strossmayer’s idea, he spoke in favour of union of southern slav peoples on federalist 
principles. Enters politics in 1905 as a member of Croatian Party of Right in Croatian-Serbian 
coalition. From1908 until 1918, he was representative for Đakovo County in Croatian Parlia-
ment. In the year of 1917, he travelled to Switzerland to make contacts with Yugoslav board. In 
1918, he was a member of National Council of Serbs, Croats ans Slovenes. After establishment of 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats ans Slovenes, he joined Croatian Community. He constantly aspired 
after Croatian-Serbian conciliation and making compromise with the Court. After Ante Pavelić’s 
departure, he publicly accused his activities in emigration. During World War Two he joined par-
tisan movement and participated with report in Second ZAVNOH meeting in Plaški on October 
12, 1943. After the war he was appointed to several political duties and posts. In the year of 1947, 
he became permanent member of YASA (JAZU). In Zagreb, he started foundation of Old-Slavic 
Academy which became Old-Slavic institute in 1952. Specially aimed for conclusion of Treaty 
between SFRY and Vatican, which took place only in 1966, after his death. See: Ćiril Petešić, 
Katoličko svećenstvo u NOB 1941-45 [The Catholic Priesthood in NOB 1941-1945], (Zagreb, 1982), 
pp. 130-154; Josip Bratulić, “Svetozar Rittig – ličnost i djelovanje” [“Svetozar Rittig – personality] 
and work”], Slovo, Vol. 44-46, Old-Slavic Academy and it’s meaning, (Zagreb, 1996), pp. 323-324; 
Miroslav Akmadža, “Svetozar Rittig – ministar svećenik u komunističkoj vladi” [“Svetozar Rittig 
– Minister Priest in Communist Government” ], VDG Jahrbuch, Vol. 15, Osijek, 2008, 101-116.
77 NAZ, Legacy of Archbishop Antun Bauer, Dnevnik, Vol. II, February 24, 1915.
78 HR-HDA-78, PLG, Box 877, Nr. 8, 694, Vukovar, November 28, 1914.
79 Đuro Šurmin, “In First year of War – Atrocities in Srijem in the year of 1914”, Novosti [Novel-
ties], June 17, 1927, 1.
80 HR-HDA-833, PF Đuro Šurmin, Box 24.
81 Dr. Srđan Budisavljević, Stvaranje Države Srba, Hrvata I Slovenaca: povodom 
četrdesetgodišnjice jugoslovenskog ujedinjenja [Making of State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
On occasion of fortieth anniversary of Yugoslav unification] (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija 
znanosti i umjetnosti, 1958): 15-18.
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Discussions have been continued after the war i.e. during the whole inter-war 
period.
Conclusion
On military-security and social problematic imminent to and during 
World War One on Srijem territory written accounts in non-fiction exist so far 
while scientists paid more attention recently. Political, military, demographic, 
security and geographical context was priory neglected and evaluations made 
according to one-sided argumentation based on consequences faced by Ser-
bian population of Srijem. In the context of scientific analysis, quality of sci-
entific work reduces analysis of combat for certainly, not taking causes and 
effects in consideration, presenting combat from one-sided perspective. On 
the contrary, if we present the problematic completely, information showing 
Serbian population after Sarajevo assassination and in the first months of war 
expressed extreme desire and act in order to accomplish grand-Serbian politi-
cal interests on the territory of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Croatia are 
not to be ignored. As every war is by itself mutual so does historian need to 
take in consideration all factors, in chronological order naturally. In the case 
as mentioned before, Austro-Hungarian Army at first insisted upon removing 
officials and temporarily transport of unreliable population, in order to be suc-
cessful based on information of intelligence character confirmed in the end. 
The fact civil authority led by Ban Ivan Skerlec and supported by Minister-
President Istvan Tisza, did not oblige their demands, not only considerably 
influenced the outcome of fighting but fate of non-Serb and Serb population of 
Srijem respectively. Military suggestions were rejected, Serbian counter attack 
took place and in that particular moment, Serbian population priory warned 
upon as unreliable, not only accepted the Serbian army overjoyed but express 
their loyalty by demolishing and burning Croatian houses and other posses-
sions and finally in combat activity.
Zusammenfassung
Besondere Stellung Syrmiens im geopolitischen Kontext vor und 
während des Ersten Weltkriegs 
Eine allgemein akzeptierte Meinung in der Geschichtsschreibung ist, dass 
Syrmien eine besondere militärisch-strategische und soziale Stellung hatte. 
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Uneinigkeiten zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und dem Königreich Serbien 
wurden immer intensiver, besonders in diesem Teile des Dreieinigen König-
reiches. Der serbischen Regierung gelang es in dieser Zeit mehrmals, Einfluss 
auf politische, soziale und Sicherheitsbedingungen in Syrmien auszuüben. 
Im Einklang mit ihren Interessen bestand zwischen der Österreichisch-Un-
garischen Monarchie und Kroatien eine Einheit, und deswegen betrachteten 
die Serben den Krieg als Beginn der letzten Schlacht gegen diese zwei Subjekte. 
Das Ziel der Serben war es, die Monarchie zu vernichten und das Königreich 
Serbien auf Kosten Kroatiens zu vergrößern. Solchen gewaltsamen Akten aus-
gesetzt, begann Österreich-Ungarn nach Modalitäten des Selbstschutzes zu 
suchen. 
Historiographische und publizistische Werke zu diesem Thema sind un-
vollständig, weil sie politischen, militärischen, demographischen und geog-
raphischen Kontext nicht berücksichtigen. Die bisherigen Interpretationen 
waren einseitig, geschrieben meistens aus der Perspektive der jugoslawischen 
Geschichtsschreibung hinsichtlich Themen, die mit Kroatien am Beginn des 
Ersten Weltkrieges verbunden waren. Wie jeder Krieg in der Geschichte war 
auch dieser Krieg zweiseitig. Bei Darstellung dessen sollte ein Geschichtssch-
reiber alle wichtigen  Faktoren in Betracht ziehen, was das grundlegende Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist.  
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